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The Nature and Potential of Corporate Governance in Developing 
Countries: Zambian Perceptions 
 
 
 
Purpose 
This paper provides detailed findings regarding the perceived role of corporate governance in Zambia. There 
have been no detailed studies of opinions in a setting such as Zambia, i.e. a nation which has experienced 
relative political calm and which has an abundance of natural resources – but where corporate governance 
failures have been blamed directly for economic difficulties.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The study reports the results of a series of 24 in-depth interviews with Zambians, including politicians, 
regulators, senior business executives, trans-national organisation representatives, academics and governance 
consultants. The discussions were conducted face-to-face and recorded in all cases. 
 
Findings 
Understanding of corporate governance is at an embryonic stage in Zambia, but embedded corruption is likely 
to require addressing before any meaningful change is likely. A range of isomorphic forces appear to be 
prevalent and the study argues that root-and-branch change in structures and attitudes is a necessity if 
improvements are to be forthcoming. The paper concludes with a call for unity in purpose and recognition of 
current malignancies. 
 
Originality/Value 
Despite Zambia’s idiosyncrasies, the evidence suggests a pan-African picture is emerging, with growing 
awareness of the potential benefits of improved corporate behaviour - but deep cynicism about the likelihood 
of these arising, given corruption in reward structures. Such is the extent of embeddedness in power amongst 
those who benefit from current arrangements that both mimetic and coercive forces are argued to be ranged 
against any shift in extant systems and processes. 
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The Nature and Potential of Corporate Governance in Developing 
Countries: Zambian Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
1. Overview 
 
This paper provides detailed insights regarding perceptions of corporate governance in Zambia, a nation with 
a recent political history that differs from many of its continental neighbours, but which continues to 
experience the type of economic malaise often attributed to failures in governance mechanisms and standards. 
Corporate governance has emerged as a leading policy concern not only in the developed world, but also in 
many emerging nations (Solomon, 2013). However, most of the research in the area continues to be 
concentrated on the wealthiest economies, ignoring those in transition - like most in Africa - where the de-
facto importance of strong governance is arguably greatest (Wanyama et al. 2009; Josiah et al., 2010). Prior 
literature examining the potential role of improved corporate governance in developing countries has explored 
the theoretical possibilities of US/UK-style codes without engaging those individuals and groups most directly 
affected; in the absence of meaningful understanding of perceptions on the ground, the practical worth of such 
investigations is inevitably limited. Given this context, the present study provides empirical evidence about 
corporate governance in Zambia from the perspective of a wide range of stakeholders, with an emphasis on 
the issues most common to current debates, including definition, drivers, legal culture, international 
influences, compliance, benefits and challenges. Unlike most of the developing countries examined to date, 
Zambia has experienced considerable political stability since gaining independence and retains plentiful 
natural resources. However, the nation has failed to sustain significant levels of economic growth, and poor 
governance across the corporate sector has been suggested as a key factor in this regard (Donge, 2008). 
 
Eden et al. (2001) point to the “role of unique political, cultural and social systems” (p. 3) at a continental 
level, suggesting that institutional influences may pervade across borders within large pan-national 
demographies. Whilst evidence has been published relating to corporate governance in various parts of 
developing Africa (e.g. Dabor and Abeyemi, 2009 for Nigeria; Wanyama et al. 2009 for Uganda) no study 
has yet examined the situation in a relatively stable, resource-rich nation such as Zambia, a task which is 
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necessary if findings generalisable to a broad set of the continent’s emerging nations are to materialise. An 
increasing trend in the literature on governance structures in developing nations is the propensity to identify 
elements of institutional isomorphism as underpinning extant practices. For example, Wanyama et al. (2009) 
point to institutional forces in Uganda so “entrenched” (p. 173) that they represent powerful impediments to 
change in governance practices; the strength of these forces leads the authors to suggest that “root and branch 
change” (p. 173) in the early education of the nation’s youth is needed. However, the precise way in which 
isomorphic forces manifest themselves in emerging African nations has itself been characterised as a function 
of national political economy, in particular democratic stability and structure (Krebat et al., 2013). As the 
focus of much of the recent literature on corporate governance in Africa has been set in the context of recent 
conflicts, there is little substantive evidence regarding the manner in which embedded forces might reveal 
themselves in a more stable nation and addressing this gap in the literature is the key motivator for the study. 
To provide comparability with prior research we focus here on the five key issues emerging from earlier work 
on African corporate governance, in particular recent studies by Wanyama et al. (2009; 2013) in Uganda,[1] 
adjusted for Zambian contextualities. These are: (i) the extent of Zambians’ experience and understanding of 
corporate governance, including its definition; (ii) drivers of corporate governance practices in Zambia, 
including the impact of external aid conditions and economic globalisation;[2] (iii) the role of legal and 
regulatory frameworks; (iv) issues relating to compliance; and (v) perceptions of the potential benefits of 
robust governance systems. Whilst the last area has typically only been addressed on an ad-hoc basis in prior 
studies, it was thought to be of fundamental practical importance for a considered investigation of extant views 
and was therefore examined explicitly here[3]. 
 
The study is based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Zambia with a diverse group of 
individuals. The findings indicate that awareness of corporate governance in Zambia is at an embryonic stage, 
with most citizens still experiencing difficulties in understanding its key implications. Nonetheless, several 
participants cited corporate governance’s propensity to attract finance, improve economic fortunes and 
minimise corruption as ranking highly in terms of potentialities, with institutional weaknesses and (resultant) 
stasis seen as the major challenges for the reform process. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that whilst 
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significant inertia continues to define the nation’s regulatory system, some pervasion of the possibilities of 
“better” corporate governance is apparent in modern day Zambian thinking. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. The next section outlines the motivation for the study, in the context of prior literature 
in the area. Section 3 describes extant governance arrangements in Zambia’s corporate sector. The fourth 
section highlights the sample selection choices made before Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical 
evidence. The final section concludes with an overview and reflection of the results and their implications.  
 
2. Motivation and Extant Literature 
The debate relating to corporate governance has gained momentum in recent years (Allen, 2005; Gillan, 2006), 
not only in the world’s richest nations but also in settings characterised by lower levels of economic 
development (Solomon et al., 2003; Hussain and Mallin, 2003). As early as 2003, Solomon et al. detected an 
increase in the pace of change in both legal systems and market listing obligations that reflected renewed focus 
on best practice in governance. The present study explores the role of corporate governance in Zambia, a 
country located in the southern part of Africa that gained its independence from Britain in 1964. The 
attainment of economic performance befitting a peaceful and politically stable nation, well-endowed with rich 
natural resources, has been elusive (see Andersson et al., 2000). Many of the issues relating to this state of 
affairs are now being viewed through a corporate governance lens, with commentators increasingly citing the 
(poor) quality of the nation’s governance standards in general - and the absence of good corporate governance 
practices in particular – as causes of the malaise (Coldough, 1997; Donge, 2008). 
 
The case for researching the issue in Zambia, despite attention having been paid to several other developing 
nations in Africa, also reflects a number of specificities that suggest continent-wide generalisation cannot yet 
be advanced. For example, Zambia has had numerous economic crises (Mwenda, 2001; Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi, 2002; Lungu, 2005) resulting in serious debt problems, problems that in theory might have been 
militated by its status as one of the richest African nations in terms of natural resources (Donge 2008; Mwenda, 
2001). Inevitably, poor governance of the firms and businesses designed to invest these resources most 
efficiently has been questioned (Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2002; Lungu, 2005) and the issue remains 
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highly topical. Despite many months of discussions - and following a delay caused by the national election in 
August 2016 – it was October 2016 before the IMF visited with an outcome whereby several conditions, 
including developing “measures to fight corruption”, must be put in place before any loan will be provided 
(Lusaka Times, 2016). Finally, although reports emanating from the office of the Auditor General of Zambia 
point to weak corporate governance, neither the government itself or other stakeholder groups (including the 
public) have shown any interest in addressing these gaps (Chulu, 2006). Given this context, Zambia appears 
to be an appropriate choice for a study of perceptions regarding corporate governance in practice and the many 
benefits it is purported to offer in a context where weaknesses clearly exist. 
 
Since gaining independence Zambia has embarked upon a series of political and economic reforms aimed at 
improving the country’s economy, but meaningful improvements have not materialised (Donge, 2008). 
Possible explanations, both internal and external, have been advanced for this failure including the country’s 
colonial history, the economic shocks of the 1970s,[4] extractive imperialism and anaemic post-independence 
economic policies that left the country heavily indebted and largely dependent on external hand-outs 
(Coldough, 1997; Haglund, 2008). However, scholarly literature points to disorder in the corporate sector 
characterised by an absence of the governance standards and accountability systems that are generally thought 
to underpin strong economic performance (Visser et al., 2006; Hansungule, 2008). While colonisation has 
been blamed for many of the continent’s development challenges (Ake, 1996),[5] Africa - Zambia in particular 
- has its own systemic financial difficulties that are unrelated to any pre-independence malignance (Kalley et 
al., 1999). Notwithstanding colonial influence, there appears to be an increasing realisation that endogenous 
factors such as corporate governance failure have not been given adequate attention in conversations about 
economic problems across the continent (Hansungule, 2008). 
 
The perceived deficiencies in organisational governance on the continent may partly be explained by the 
emergence at independence of African leaders who were widely regarded as heroic freedom fighters, thus 
insulating themselves from meaningful questioning or scrutiny on the part of the citizenry (Armah and Amoah, 
2010). This propensity for torpor, coupled with Africa’s weak institutional arrangements allowed the ruling 
elites to continue abusing state resources with impunity (Rossouw, 2005; Cooper, 2007) and this underlying 
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governance issue has been held directly responsible for the continent’s developmental stagnation[6] (World 
Bank, 1989; Hansungule, 2008). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), contends that 
Africa requires a robust system of governance if it is to achieve meaningful economic goals. NEPAD has cited 
corporate governance as a key factor in this context, but one that has been consistently ignored in reforms 
aimed at African (economic) emancipation (NEPAD, 2007). Despite extensive research in developed nations, 
most African countries, including Zambia, have yet to incorporate governance thinking into debates about 
corporate reforms (Donge, 2008; Haglund, 2009). For a nation that is looking to attract capital for growth, the 
omission defies (what is now) conventional theorising whereby “strong” corporate governance underpins 
global investment decisions (Siddiqui, 2010). 
 
Poor economic performance in developing nations is now often attributed directly to failures in accountability 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Akokpari, 2004; NEPAD, 2007). Given the well-documented link between 
shortcomings in accountability and corporate governance in developing nations (Wanyama et al., 2009; 
Wanyama et al., 2013) it seems reasonable to suggest that governance practices in Zambia may have been a 
factor in the nation’s plethora of accountability problems and broader economic stagnation. As noted above, 
it is becoming increasingly evident that isomorphic forces have played a major role in shaping governance 
systems in post-conflict Africa, particularly by fostering stasis. However, failure to identify the nature of any 
links between national environment and extant practices - an important limitation in the prior literature given 
Eden et al. (2001)’s contention that: “the actions of organizations are primarily defined by the local 
infrastructure of a particular region” (p. 3) - reduces the extent of generalisability to more stable environments 
such as Zambia. The institutionalised nature of forces ranged against improved accountability in developing 
nations is evident in the prior literature and thus provides an appropriate lens for examining perceptions about 
governance in research sites where the issue has not been examined empirically. The emphasis here, following 
practice in prior work such as the body of evidence on Uganda provided by Wanyama et al., is on capturing 
perceptions across a diverse stakeholder base, whilst acknowledging epistemological subjectivity and 
openness to interpretation. Stakeholder views are likely to provide valuable insights into the current state of 
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understanding regarding corporate governance and whether attempts to improve matters will be taking place 
in the context of a population that comprehends the key ideas and their potential impact on Zambian lives. 
 
The unique character of developing African nations provides both opportunities and challenges for research 
(Armstrong, 2003). Use of country-specific research sites, as in the present study, fits with the notion that: “to 
assume that all countries will adapt to the same corporate governance structures is unrealistic” (Clarke, 2007 
p. 265) and contributes meaningfully to the debate regarding the applicability of international standards in 
individual nations. In 2001, Lu and Batten questioned the transnational approach to the study of corporate 
governance, criticising cultural mismatches and failures to recognise the varying levels of economic and legal 
development across jurisdictions. Similarly, Reed (2002) argues that heterogeneity in developing nations’ 
political and financial contexts calls for investigations in such environments that fully assimilate the way in 
which corporate governance interfaces with those responsible for overseeing economic development. In this 
regard, the current paper’s contribution is important because it focuses exclusively on Zambia, taking detailed 
account of the nation’s cultural, political and economic particularities. While some Zambian characteristics 
are common to the African nations investigated in prior studies, the relative political calm and abundance of 
natural resources - with success in large scale exportation of the latter - are atypical, not just in Africa, but in 
the developing world more generally.  
 
As pointed out earlier, most modern analyses of corporate governance systems across the globe are founded 
on key elements of institutional theory and the focus of the present study on issues such as aid conditionality, 
compliance with extant rules and the role of regulation, reflect this theoretical underpinning. Recent examples 
of this paradigm choice include Tsamenyi et al.’s (2006) employment of Di Maggio and Powell’s 
isomorphism model as an explanatory tool in the context of large scale deregulation, evidencing in particular 
its role in legitimising aspects of the change process.[7] In the developing nation context of Fiji, Reddy and 
Sharma (2014) explore the broader issue of corporate governance compliance, but so do on the basis of 
institutional theorising that reflects a key role for (legitimising) isomorphism. Of particular relevance to 
studies of emerging nations, Reddy and Sharma cite Judge et al. (2008)’s contention that: “corporate 
 8 
governance legitimacy is conceptualised as one of the means by which a nation constrains and directs 
corporate activity so that it efficiently creates economic value and equitably distributes economic wealth. 
Hence, the legitimacy of the corporate governance system is pivotal to Fiji’s economic system” (p. 74). As a 
developing nation with clear evidence of economic malaise over the long-term, such logic is easily extended 
to the Zambian context. 
 
3. Corporate Governance in Zambia 
3.1 Overview 
Anxiety regarding corporate conduct and functioning in the wake of various scandals in the developed world 
has provoked considerable interest in governance systems, but this debate has not been restricted to the nations 
where the problems have been most prominent (Wu, 2005). The focus of discussions has widened from 
(initially) being restricted to developed countries dominated by large firms to the emerging world where, in 
many cases, government ministries, trade unions, charities (including faith-based organisations) and local 
authorities play a more significant role in economic activity (Arun and Turner, 2009; Wanyama et al., 2013). 
Firms in the US, Europe and elsewhere in the developed world responded to a series of high profile scandals 
with targeted reforms (Berglöf and Claessens, 2004); on the other hand, in many African countries corporate 
governance changes, like political reforms, have been embraced only reluctantly, often emphasising form over 
substance (Chulu, 2006; Josiah et al., 2010). In most African nations, the principles espoused by theoretically 
robust corporate governance practices often run counter to the prerogatives of power-driven, authoritative 
politics that characterise the continent (Gruzd, 2008). This incongruity can foster and stimulate opaqueness, 
allowing key institutions to operationalise policies that, at worst, suggest contempt for (and intolerance of) 
conventional notions of transparency and accountability (Shkolnikov, 2002). The lack of checks and balances 
on public accountability lead in turn to the promotion of corruption, self-entrenchment and self-enrichment 
amongst the governing elite, at the expense of national prosperity (Shkolnikov, 2002; Gruzd, 2008). 
 
This paper focuses on levels of understanding and perceptions regarding the potential of corporate governance 
in Zambia, with the emphasis on factors driving practical developments as well as the institutional and 
legislative arrangements and initiatives that have helped shaped contemporary debates. In relatively recent 
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history, Zambia can point to a buoyant economy - a legacy of the pre-independence era - in which copper 
accounted for over 70 per cent of export earnings (Ihonvbere, 1996; Coldough, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000; 
Lungu and Kapena, 2010). This success allowed Zambia to operate with a balanced external trading account 
and supported significant investment in sectors (such as health and education) that were considered key to 
development. However, over-reliance on a sector where governance standards were as low as anywhere in the 
country became an issue when a sharp decrease in copper prices in the early 1970s dramatically changed the 
economic landscape, causing severe financial hardship for most Zambians (Haglund, 2008). This was seen by 
many as the starting point for what became a long slump in the economic fortunes of a once-prosperous 
country (Ihonvbere, 1996); copper revenues - which between 1965 and 1973 accounted for over 35 per cent 
of Zambia’s GDP, over 70 per cent of all export earnings and 45 per cent of total Zambian government 
revenues - halved in value on the world market in less than two years (Zacher, 1993). 
 
Zambia has experienced three major economic governance phases since independence: the open market 
economy that continued after British rule until 1969, followed by two decades of state control and planning 
and a subsequent return to free market principles in 1991; each of these involved particular governance 
challenges for the corporate sector (Lungu, 2005; Chulu, 2006). In the first phase, corporate governance 
principles were based on a well-established (colonial) market system driven by the private sector while the 
state provided a supportive environment for business (Mulwila, 1980; Chulu, 2006). During this period, the 
Zambian government acknowledged the important role that the private sector played in economic 
development, as manifested in the world’s richest nations, including the UK, from where key elements of 
Zambian company law could trace their origin (Mulwila, 1980). In this phase, foreign companies with 
ownership structures and governance models reflecting Anglo-American norms dominated domestic 
economic activity (Turok, 1980). The 1970s and 1980s witnessed large scale nationalisation of major 
industries. Economic performance deteriorated, leading to IMF involvement and, ultimately, the end of 
Kenneth Kaunda’s presidential reign in 1991; a programme of economic transition based on privatisation and 
liberalisation that pertains to this day was then set in train by incoming President Frederick Chiluba (Chulu, 
2006). 
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3.2 Implications of the post-1991 Reforms for Corporate Governance in Zambia 
Literature suggests that one of the main drivers of corporate governance change in Africa is its purported role 
in fostering economic growth (Charkham and Ploix, 2005; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008; Arun and Turner, 
2009). In the development context, North et al. (2008) argue that governance should be viewed as part of the 
broad institutional arrangements that underpin economic performance, with robust systems requiring the 
underpinning that only strong institutional capacity can provide (La Porta et al., 1997; Rossouw, 2005). 
Several studies on the African continent attribute deficiencies in corporate governance to failures in this regard 
(Haglund, 2009; Wanyama et al., 2009), but the World Bank (2004) contends that Zambia is particularly weak 
in these terms. 
 
An increasing body of literature (e.g. Dabor and Adeyemi, 2009) suggests that corporate governance reform 
goes hand-in-hand with public sector governance reform. The economic reforms that followed radical political 
change in 1991 saw the role of the Zambian state - which at one stage controlled more than 80 per cent of all 
economic activity (Kalinda and Floro, 1992) - reduce, paving the way for private ownership with the stated 
aim of improving the management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The consequent changes in ownership 
structures had major implications for corporate governance in Zambia, leading to heightened debate regarding 
the way in which companies should be controlled (Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2002). As a major foreign 
aid destination nation, governance and accountability pressures were also mounting in Zambia by way of the 
detailed conditionalities imposed by major donors (Silwamba, 2009). However, the first direct consideration 
of corporate governance in the country began with the establishment of the Institute of Directors of Zambia 
(IODZ) in 2000. Although progress was slow, this development led in 2005 to the emergence of the nation’s 
first corporate governance code, the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) Code, pertaining to all listed companies. 
The creation of the Lusaka exchange in 1994 had itself reflected a governmental economic reform programme 
designed to develop the nation’s financial and capital market, supporting and enhancing private sector 
initiatives and facilitating the divestiture of state ownership by creating a broad shareholding base (Lusaka 
Stock Exchange, 2005). This initiative was followed by the publication of the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) corporate 
governance guidelines in 2006, developed in the wake of several systemic scandals in the financial sector[8] 
(Bank of Zambia, 2006). Similarly, the 2008 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, 
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Governance, Human Rights and Gender Matters cited the absence of “good” governance as the cause of extant 
corporate misconduct (Zambia National Assembly, 2008). The BOZ commitment was augmented by the 
publication of IODZ guidelines in 2009 and the establishment of a governance secretariat in the Ministry of 
Justice – as well as the nation’s accession to Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism[9] in 2006. These initiatives 
suggest a shift in attitudes amongst Zambian authorities towards improving governance standards, but the 
extent to which this has been felt in practice remains untested; this omission is one of the main motivations of 
the present study. 
 
Notwithstanding these developments, the push for greater accountability and robust corporate governance 
practices in developing countries has been shown to be fraught with challenges that continue to impinge on 
the reform process; cultural barriers, a lack of appropriate legislation, weak institutional and regulatory 
frameworks, and rampant corruption are some of the most commonly-reported impediments (see, e.g. Dabor 
and Adeyemi, 2009; Wanyama, et al., 2009, 2013). In Zambia, the desire for better corporate behaviour itself 
is often based on the assumption that strong governance has the propensity to infuse the values of fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency into institutional systems at all levels (Obong’o, 2009). 
 
 
4. Methodology and Methods   
The present study appropriates ontological assumptions premised on the awareness that reality is created by 
one’s consciousness (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Siau and Rossi, 2011). Interviews have increasingly been 
used as a research method in social sciences in this context (Kvale, 1996), including in enquiries related to 
corporate governance matters (Solomon, 2013). In the context of the current study, interviews were used to 
capture detailed views regarding corporate governance, as contextualised by individuals’ own experiences. 
Lofland and Lofland (1996) suggest that in order to acquire social knowledge (i.e. knowledge relating to 
human activities, concepts and ways of ‘being’ social) the inquirer must get as far inside the mind of other 
human beings as possible. In this sense, the research is not viewed as an abstract notion, but instead involves 
interactions with others and understanding of the way in which actors make the world meaningful in their own 
terms (see Krauss, 2005). 
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The choice of interview participants was based primarily on the participants’ potential exposure to corporate 
governance debates and their willingness to participate in the research. Twenty-four individuals were 
identified on this basis, with the interviews taking place between 1st May and 19th July 2011. Contributors 
were drawn from various stakeholder groups and individuals representing: members of the IODZ; researchers 
and academics; government; Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); the LuSE; Chief Executive Officers 
from private and public sectors; regulators; governance consultants; international organisations and 
multinational companies operating in Zambia; the National Assembly; and other individuals. With permission 
from interviewees, all the interviews were taped[10] and later transcribed; Table 1 details the number of words 
per interviewee after transcription.[11] Interviews were conducted at times and locations favoured by 
interviewees, with the latter including both interviewees’ places of work and private residences.[12] The 
average duration was one hour, with the shortest interview lasting just 30 minutes at a highly sensitive 
government office where both the interviewer and interviewee were watchful and conservative.[13]  
[Table 1 about here] 
The interviews were designed on a semi-structured basis in order to achieve a detailed understanding of 
opinions without constraining the direction of the discussions; the questions posed reflected the five themes 
outlined earlier in the paper. Several interviewees expressed their appreciation that a detailed study of this 
kind was being undertaken in Zambia. As such, participants appeared to find the topic interesting and relevant, 
particularly given the nation’s on-going reform programme and debate about its implications for economic 
performance and development. In this context, interviews were only restricted by time and not ideas. For 
example one participant, a senior academician interviewed at his official residence, remarked that: “I wish we 
had the whole day to discuss corporate governance and development in Zambia.”  
 
To ensure a systematic review of the evidence, the interview recordings were transcribed and then subjected 
to an initial read-through focussing on the identification of common themes. Whilst the notion of researchers 
identifying themes in the viewpoints of multiple individuals inevitably introduces an element of subjectivity 
into any empirical analysis, Husserl (1970) contends that meaningful understandings of human motivation can 
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never be fully objective and so, from an ontological perspective, subjectivity in categorising responses is 
inevitable and not a major impediment to the research process. The transcribed data revealed several consistent 
arguments, and quotes capturing these as pervasively as possible were selected for inclusion in the text. In 
some cases, however, opinions differed across significant numbers of respondents. For example, Section 5.3 
of the paper, which relates to the legal and regulatory aspects of governance, includes quotes from interviewees 
9 and 14 that reflect the two broad schools of thought that emerged.  More generally, themes were identified 
at different points in the research process, before, during and after data collection. Themes were also identified 
during the process of reviewing the literature, theoretical orientation and via the researchers’ personal 
experiences with corporate governance matters in developing economies. The overall approach was based on 
a belief that themes thus identified represent transcribed texts’ similarities with and differences from each 
other, in line with the "constant comparison” methodology described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Flick 
(2009) in fact suggests that the process of coding responses on a thematic basis is appropriate in situations 
where “sampling is oriented to the groups whose perspectives seem to be most instructive for analysis” and 
data is gathered on the basis of “defining topics and at the same time remaining open to the views related to 
them” (p. 318) both of which were the case here. 
 
Theme discovery first involved careful reading of larger blocks of transcribed texts, scanning for word 
repetitions. This in-depth, line-by-line scrutiny facilitated identification of the common terms participants used 
in order to describe both concrete and abstract notions. Words and phrases that were used frequently were 
identified as being salient in the minds of respondents, an approach that Spradley (1979) refers to as 
“interviewing” the text. Repeated use of particular words indicated that these ideas were important, recurring 
themes in respondents’ lived experiences. All the unique words employed were also identified and the number 
of times each was used - and the number of respondents who used them - counted. This information provided 
a basis for theme description. A number of quotes that on first reading appeared rather sentimental, but 
representative of the transcribed text, were also identified. These quotes tied together several thematic 
elements to indicate a deeper appreciation of the significance of the subject matter. The identified quotes were 
then written down alongside a note of who said it and where it appeared in the text, with this new 
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documentation becoming the reference point for final analysis. The selected quotes were intended to highlight 
respondents’ feelings, indicating awareness and understanding of the issues to hand. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
 
5.1 Experience and Definition 
5.1.1 Awareness and Understanding 
There was wide agreement amongst the participants that corporate governance is a relatively new phenomenon 
in Zambia; although most had some understanding of its key principles, this was generally very basic. For 
example, interviewee 3 – an IODZ executive – characterised corporate governance in Zambia as a “green 
field” adding that: “a lot needs to be done because there are people that are not even aware that there is such 
a thing.” Recent literature suggests that corporate governance has become an issue of worldwide importance 
(Wanyama et al., 2009; Mallin, 2013; Solomon, 2013) yet it was clear from the discussions here that in Zambia 
the concept is embryonic at best, with no meaningful levels of awareness and understanding of the concept, 
or its potential implications for the economic well-being of the country. This evidence is consistent with the 
outcome of the Zambia Country Self-Assessment Report (2010), which indeed suggested that a lack of 
cognisance might make it difficult for most Zambians to appreciate the benefits of sound governance, both at 
corporate and state levels. 
 
Understanding and awareness of corporate governance appears to have been effectively absent in Zambia until 
the IODZ’s formation and their subsequent attempts to embed increased comprehension. However, a former 
president of the IODZ (interviewee 9) expressed concern here when asked about the pace of change, 
particularly in SOEs, arguing that although “much” has been achieved: 
“… the government, being a key stakeholder, is an area where things are still in very bad shape. The 
government has ratified a number of international standards on corporate governance, but they do not 
seem to have use for them. Equally, corporate governance has not moved at a fast pace, particularly in 
government-controlled entities” 
 
While there may be other factors playing a role here, the slow pace of pervasion of corporate governance 
familiarity is likely to reflect the country’s experience of state capitalism, characterised by an aura of 
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secretiveness and patronage (Chulu, 2006). The evidence here suggests that some individuals still believe that 
the nation’s SOEs represent little more than de-facto extensions of the ruling party with, as a consequence, 
resources effectively belonging to no-one. The perceived problems were further compounded by interviewees’ 
concerns regarding high levels of political interference in Zambian SOEs which manifest themselves most 
obviously in terms of political appointments and subsequent board domination (Donge, 2008). The current 
president of the IODZ argued that engagement is key to overcoming the evident institutional malaise, 
suggesting that corporate governance is critical going forward as it will consolidate the stakeholder concept 
in national debates. In particular, he maintained that: 
“Under state control we never took business seriously. People did not feel that personal touch or 
personal responsibility because whether they worked or not they were still paid a salary at the end of 
the month. But now people are beginning to realise that we need to work very hard to sustain our 
businesses, and this is where corporate governance becomes very important. Once we embed corporate 
governance in our structures and cultures everybody is a stakeholder and therefore must play a role in 
creating wealth.” 
 
In such circumstances, the consequences are predictable: poor performance in SOEs and a failure to deliver 
on the commercial front as well (Josiah et al., 2010). The implications of the evidence in this regard is that 
programmes designed for corporate governance sensitisation remain critical in Zambia and must not only 
focus on good practices, but on changing peoples’ mind-sets as well because they are the architects of 
corporate culture (Wanyama et al., 2009). However, Zambia’s corporate governance advocates have been 
quick to point out that the landscape is changing and some gains have been achieved, especially in the private 
sector (Zambia Country Self-Assessment Report, 2010). Consistent with this viewpoint, the interview 
participants believed that the local corporate governance guidelines referred to earlier represent evidence that 
the issue is gaining some traction on the ground. In addition, there was wide recognition of the important role 
that Zambia’s many small, family-held companies - if properly run - can play in the country’s future 
development. Participants’ recognition of small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs’) significance appeared to be 
premised on an assumption that the sector represents a collection of local resources that are critical to the 
development process in emerging economies. There were also signs that, albeit slowly, the significance of the 
manner in which corporations are governed is starting to be appreciated. For example, the establishment of a 
governance secretariat under the Ministry of Justice, augmented by the endorsement of Africa’s Peer Review 
Mechanism (APMR), was seen as providing evidence of state commitment to improving governance practices 
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within its own circles and benefitting the country as a whole. These changes, and the perceptions evidenced 
above of stronger governance principles embedding themselves within the system, suggests (some) addressing 
of the need for institutionalised change identified by Yang and Modell (2012) in the context of “value rigidity,” 
where the latter represents “an inability of individuals to dis-embed their actions from their values and beliefs 
when confronted with negative feedback from the institutional environment” (p. 106). Assimilation of the 
APMR’s inherent positivity in this situation suggests awareness of the need to move beyond individual action 
to develop organisational legitimacy for attempts to improve entrenched practices. 
 
5.1.2 Defining Corporate Governance 
The inter-disciplinary nature of the corporate governance concept, coupled with business environment 
dynamisms and fluidity, has been advanced as an explanation of why attempts to generate a universally-
accepted definition have failed (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Mallin, 2013; Solomon, 2013). Aguilera and 
Jackson suggest that emergence of a common definition is unlikely given heterogeneity in global practices 
that mitigate against universality, whilst Lee (2006) argues simply that: “Corporate governance appears to 
have as many meanings as it has its users” (p. 29). The lack of a common conceptualisation is of particular 
relevance to Africa according to Wanyama et al. (2009) who contend that meaningful improvements in 
practices are unlikely in the continent’s emerging nations without a consistent understanding establishing itself 
amongst stakeholder groups.[14] The multidimensional character of the modern corporation means that there 
are many competing interests involved (Mulherin, 2005), which in turn implies that a broad analysis of 
operations and processes is required rather than one which focusses exclusively on shareholders. Prior 
literature on Africa (e.g. Visser et al., 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009; Josiah et al., 2010) claims that to have a 
significant impact on institutional behaviour, corporate governance needs to be widely understood as 
consistent with notions of tribe, family and clan, contextual factors absent by definition from a shareholder-
centric paradigm. Nonetheless, despite the inherent difficulty in deriving a globally-relevant definition, a 
number of scholars have suggested that the issues of accountability, transparency, disclosure and fairness are 
universal in their normative applicability to the search for an over-arching framework (e.g. Oman, 2003; 
Solomon, 2013).  
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Correspondingly, the participants here proposed definitions ranging from one based exclusively on the 
interests of shareholders, to varieties reflecting social responsibility and multi-stakeholder inclusivity. The 
interviewees often mentioned issues such as stakeholder participation, transparency, accountability, checks 
and balances, disclosure, fairness, social responsibility, corruption, human rights, environmental concerns and 
the creation of wealth for all. The judgement of interviewee 15, a senior executive in the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), was typical in this regard:  
“Corporate governance is concerned with the ethical principles, values and practices that facilitate 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. 
The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society within a 
framework of sound governance and common good.” 
 
 
Whilst the discussion above suggests a willingness to take a broad view regarding the purview of corporate 
governance, the findings here are consistent with prior emerging nation literature (e.g. Siddiqui, 2010) in 
evidencing a wide range of opinions, but with the dominance (in this case via the support of 75 per cent of 
interviewees) of formulations along the lines of “the system by which companies are directed and controlled,” 
i.e. the description in the original UK-based Cadbury Report of 1992.[15] This confirms earlier scholarly 
observations (e.g. Wanyama et al., 2009 and Bondamakara, 2010 for Uganda and Zimbabwe respectively) 
that, despite being viewed as narrowly focused, the terminology of the 1992 report has established its own 
hegemony, even where cultural contexts – including those recognised and emphasised by research participants 
– emphasise broader societal links.[16] Given the Cadbury report (and its antecedents)’s Anglo-centric style 
and principal-agent core, it was thought likely here that Zambians would see its approach and attendant 
terminology as being of limited relevance precisely because it ignores the continent’s centuries’ old emphasis 
on community relations (Sheikh and Rees, 1995; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). However, the opposing 
evidence fits with findings reported elsewhere and suggests the continuing dominance of Western influence 
on the language of corporate governance debates. This apparently anomalous pattern in the results is likely to 
reflect the underlying gap in knowledge and comprehension depth identified here and in prior work on 
governance perceptions in Africa; the discussion of the broader issues which continues below suggests that a 
working appreciation would need to diffuse sufficiently in practice to allow community, societal and other 
traditional spheres of concern in Zambia to be addressed. 
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Indeed, contrary to the prevalence of support for the narrow Cadbury-originating definition, several 
participants raised issues concerning corporate governance mechanisms that only address the relationship 
between shareholders and their agents, suggesting that in Zambia - a country where the majority of companies 
are family-controlled SMEs and where dispersed ownership is uncommon - corporate governance mechanisms 
should venture beyond a shareholder-centric perspective to encompass wider stakeholder inclusivity and thus 
be fleshed out to capture reality in a meaningful way. The participants argued that if improved corporate 
governance is to make a lasting difference to people’s lives it must lead to standard of living benefits for the 
population at large. In this context interviewee 23, a governance consultant, claimed that:  
“Corporate governance goes beyond corporate affiliation to include government, trade unions, 
teachers’ unions, local government, churches and any other organisation or institution that has 
resources at its disposal and has individuals or groups of individuals who decide how to apply these 
resources on behalf of others for the betterment of that particular organisation or institution and 
stakeholders.” 
 
The viewpoints evidenced in this section suggest a multi-institutional, interactive perspective on and 
understanding of corporate governance in modern-day Zambia. This broad standpoint suggests some grounds 
for an optimistic outlook going forward, given Lounsbury (2008)’s contention that a: “more complete 
approach to practice that accounts for institutional processes requires attention to the broader cultural 
frameworks that are created and changed by field-level actors, as well as the lower-level activities of 
organizations and other actors that articulate with those frameworks” (p. 356). Whilst Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) note the propensity for mythical properties to rationalise and legitimise extant practices in the absence 
of effective rule enforcement – an issue returned to below – understanding about the impact of institutional 
links on governance practices was clearly evident amongst those taking part in the study. 
 
5.2 Drivers of Corporate Governance in Zambia 
5.2.1 Underlying Notions 
A number of attempts have been made to identify the main drivers of observed corporate governance 
developments around the world (e.g. Charkham and Ploix, 2005; Mallin, 2013) with a common approach 
emerging based on the need to properly understand conflicts between owners and managers in the context of 
globalisation and high profile company malfunctions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
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Brennan and Solomon, 2008). However, the participants here argued that the shareholder-centric approach 
dominant in most western governance principles (and supported - on one level at least - in Zambia as per the 
discussion in the previous section) contrasts with the local community’s values and beliefs. This evidence is 
consistent with earlier analyses of Africa which highlight governance debates similar in principle to those 
taking place in the developed world, but in practice coalescing around a broader set of issues (Jackson, 2004). 
In the interviews here, the catalysts for change identified most often included external influence/donor 
pressure, company failures (both local and international) and globalisation. These issues are all explored in 
further detail below. 
 
The NEPAD framework of 2007 represents one of the few African-based attempts to set out the developmental 
potential of corporate governance, declaring the latter to be a fundamental requirement for economic 
advancement. The majority of participants in the present study expressed views consistent with this assertion; 
for example, interviewee 12, a government agency manager, suggested straight-forwardly that: 
“In Zambia we view good corporate governance [in the context of] economic growth and development 
because it is about accountability, transparency, disclosure and fairness all of which we have been 
struggling to achieve as a nation. Because of these problems, we have failed to develop our country 
despite abundant natural resources. We experience high poverty levels in the midst of plenty as a result 
of bad governance.”  
 
Similarly, one of the academic interviewees, interviewee 1, argued that although corporate governance can be 
viewed through a business-only lens, in the local context attention must also be paid to the broader stakeholder 
notion, including the national economy and the general well-being of the country. The essential nature of the 
governance concept and the extent of its universality represented one of the few areas where responses from 
interviewees differed in a systematic way, with two distinct viewpoints emerging.[17] One group argued that 
because of their global character, extant corporate governance principles would not be wholly applicable to 
Zambia. These individuals emphasised the need for Zambia to come up with its own corporate governance 
principles that are localised and designed to address the country’s specific challenges. The argument was 
anchored on the understanding that Zambia’s political, social, economic, cultural and historical backgrounds 
are unique, certainly very different to those pertaining in the countries from where the highest profile sets of 
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principles and rules emanate; these characteristics were argued to influence significantly extant governance 
structures.[18] In contrast, a second group believed that in a globalised world, specificities are not necessary. 
These interviewees believed that the most important principles of corporate governance do not require regional 
or cultural contextualising, supporting this view with the argument that Zambia has to compete with other 
countries in attracting the global capital needed to develop the nation and local standards may not be 
acceptable.[19] 
 
5.2.2 External Pressure – Aid Conditionality  
Zambia has long been a major donor aid destination (Burnside and Dollar, 1997) indeed as noted above, at the 
time of writing the nation is attempting to finalise a bail-out deal with the IMF. The opinions of interviewee 
17, a senior executive, were typical in identifying a direct link between development aid and governance 
standards; he argued that: 
“Well-run companies can source capital from international organisations such as the World Bank, the 
International Finance Corporation, the Africa Development Bank and others. Such companies with 
well-established corporate governance structures demonstrate capacity to pay back. Before accessing 
money from such lending financial institutions, firms must have passed the corporate governance test.” 
 
 The majority of the interviewees believed that foreign assistance targeted at development can play a 
significant role in the country’s economic transformation and improve the lives of Zambians through access 
to quality education, clean water/sanitation, quality healthcare and robust infrastructure. However interviewee 
19, an academic, believed that these types of goals will only be achieved under a system of ‘good’ governance 
and accountability, which is precisely what the majority of interviewees argued is lacking in Zambia. In this 
regard, interviewee 1 suggested that the inclusion of governance conditionality in development assistance 
eligibility criteria is designed primarily to enhance accountability and corporate governance. This architecture 
represents a common basis that most aid providers consider essential for the development of good governance 
practice, particularly in emerging nations where accountability institutions are conventionally weak 
(Akokpari, 2004). Interviewee 18, the IODZ President, drew attention to one case in point thus: 
“After the scandals in the Ministry of Health, the government of Zambia and the donor community 
have entered into a governance plan. One condition of this plan is that the government refund the 
misappropriated funds in the Ministry of Health. On the other hand, Sweden and the Netherlands have 
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also attached conditions of improved financial governance before they can resume funding the 
Ministry again.” 
 
While the individuals behind the scandal have not been sanctioned, interviewees 7 and 19 both pointed out 
that reimbursements for the misappropriated funds will ultimately have to be paid for by Zambian tax payers. 
According to interviewees 6, 13 and 18, these events resulted in some donors cutting development aid sharply, 
leading to consequential losses of substantial foreign assistance. Several interviewees argued further that the 
events exacerbated donors’ push for good governance and accountability. In this context interviewee 12, a 
government agency manager, stressed that while there is a notion that donor assistance normally comes with 
‘strings’ attached, the government never fully explains what these are and it is only now that Zambians are 
beginning to understand that these strings are actually governance and accountability-related. For interviewee 
12, it is these conditions that cause an inherent tension between the government and donors. Interviewees 6, 
9, 13, 17 and 22 all believed that, as a complement to private investment, development assistance works well 
in environments supported by effective governance practices; such efforts are, however, often resisted by the 
governing elite. This tendency suggests a reason for the failure of development aid to leave a significant mark 
on Zambia and most other African countries (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000). 
 
5.2.3 Governance Failures  
Corporate failures in dubious circumstances in the developed world triggered and reinvigorated debates 
regarding the manner in which companies are directed and controlled (Allen, 2005). For Zambia and other 
developing nations, improving the economy, reducing corruption via higher standards of accountability and 
attracting foreign investment have been proposed as the most directly relevant issues, rather than scandal-
driven collapses per se (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008). However, according to the interviewees taking part in 
the present study, failures of high profile companies abroad (as well as Zambia’s own experiences) have had 
a compelling influence on the domestic corporate governance agenda, suggesting that in the absence of robust 
practices, governance mistakes have been inevitable. In this regard, interviewee 12 pointed to his own 
experience of the problems in the banking sector in the 1990s: 
“As one of the pioneers of the BOZ corporate governance guidelines, the code was an afterthought of 
the systematic bank collapses that we experienced in the 1990s. The failures were about, among other 
things, failure to recover loans, creative accounting, unethical conduct both by people working in the 
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banks and by banks themselves as corporate entities, management getting heft loans from their own 
banks, incompetent boards of directors just to mention a few. Now when you critically look at all these 
irregularities, they clearly show that corporate governance was missing, so we had to bring in a 
corporate governance code.” 
 
The failures in accounting cited by interviewee 12 can usefully be viewed in the context of his comments cited 
earlier connecting broader accountability failures to Zambia’s economic difficulties. The link between 
accountability weaknesses and both micro- and macro-level financial failure now pervades much of the 
literature on governance in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Josiah et al., 2010; Wanyama, et al. 2009; 2013). 
Wanyama et al. (2009) in fact suggest that reduction in corruption is critical in Uganda, necessary before any 
of the putative benefits of sound corporate governance are likely to be felt. Most[20] of the Zambians 
interviewed here appeared to believe that corruption is pervasive in the nation and remains a major challenge 
to efforts aimed at improving practices. Weaknesses in the de-facto legal and regulatory framework - 
particularly in terms of the lack of penalties for non-compliance - were cited by respondents as being directly 
responsible for escalating corruption levels, with robust corporate governance practices seen as unlikely to 
emerge unless this fundamental issue is tackled. A very similar concern is reported in Wanyama et al. (2009) 
for Uganda and it is evident that the problem is not confined to any one nation on the African continent. The 
views of interviewee 7, an executive manager in the Zambian business forum, were typical here in 
acknowledging the theoretical potential of strong governance systems, but pointing to the absence of the strong 
legal underpinning required in practice: 
“High levels of corruption are a sign of the absence of corporate governance therefore successful 
implementation of corporate governance is an effective way of fighting corruption. Abundant and 
articulate anti-corruption legal provisions do exist in this country but the problem has been with the 
complexity of corruption cases coupled with the weak legislative and regulatory frameworks.” 
 
More generally, the view emerged that if systemic enforcement failures can be rooted out, a shift from a 
legalistic approach to a practical governance ideology in the fight against corruption would be a positive step, 
in turn suggestive of a more modern, holistic methodology that allows other stakeholders to participate in the 
change process. Thus, in so far as the interviewees’ opinions are typical, Zambians would like to think that 
the need to tackle corruption should be a major driver for change in the sense that the call for robust corporate 
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governance mechanisms are seen as responses to the need for a long-term oriented approach to addressing the 
problem. 
  
5.2.4 Liberalisation, Globalisation and Privatisation 
Globalisation has emerged as a hotly-debated topic in recent discussions of corporate behaviour in emerging 
markets because of its implications for the governance of national economies and political systems (Haque, 
2001). The emergence of globalisation has witnessed shifts in the political economy of Africa whereby the 
role of the state in economic decision-making and planning has been significantly curtailed, replaced by 
market forces with the need for robust corporate governance a central part of the agenda (Haque, 2001; Josiah 
et al., 2010). In the wake of global pressures, the governance issue has come under the microscope because 
of trade liberalisation and increased international competition for capital (Muma, 2008). Here, around half of 
the participants cited globalisation as one of the key drivers of corporate governance in Zambia and fully 
endorsed the notion that improvements therein can contribute to Zambia’s ability to reap the full benefits of 
transnational influences. 
 
Interview participants cited reforms in the management of the Zambian economy that focus on reducing the 
role of government in business as another catalyst for innovation in governance systems. A fundamental 
component of the economic reform programme was the large-scale privatisation of SOEs; Chulu (2006) argues 
that under the state-control model pertaining in Zambia prior to the 1990s the stakeholder notion was pursued 
to its extreme, leading to over-extraction of SOEs’ resources in order to provide public goods (see also Lungu, 
2005). Although the benefits were shared between economic and social goals, this resource depletion was 
blamed by several interviewees for the collapse of the country’s SOE sector. Political intervention at board 
level was in fact seen as a more general problem, with interviewee 12 contending that:  
“Under government control, SOEs were only accountable to the government and the party in power 
and not the institutions and the public at large. Privatisation has actually improved governance because 
people now have a personal touch to these companies.” 
 
It was thus evident that renewed investment via privatisation is seen as a governance-related issue with 
(potential) benefits in situations where state-control extends well-beyond what might be seen as socially-
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orientated support (see also Josiah et al., 2010). However, cynicism was evident amongst the interviewees 
regarding the extent to which any such theoretical gains can be reaped in the absence of robust regulatory 
frameworks with meaningful enforcement powers. Consistent with this evidence of a lack of faith in internal 
pressure facilitating change in state bodies, Sutheewasinnon et al. (2016) note that in the context of the 
struggling public sector in the developing nation of Thailand: “Institutional theory argues that for changes to 
occur the existing institutions need to be shown as failing and there needs to be a strong external actor able to 
enforce the new institutions” (p. 15). 
 
5.3 Legal / Regulatory Framework 
The role of a nation’s legal system in underpinning its corporate governance framework is now widely 
recognised (Jensen, 1993; La Porta, et al., 1997). Indeed, in recent years a large volume of literature has 
examined the interplay between corporate governance and legal regime quality (La Porta et al., 2000; Berglöf 
and Claessens, 2004; OECD, 2004; Rossouw, 2005).  Several of the Zambians taking part in the present study 
made this point explicitly but, consistent with the perspectives outlined earlier regarding corruption, it was 
also stressed that the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms generates a glass ceiling for de-facto corporate 
governance standards. For example, one of the academic interviewees (interviewee 1), suggested that: 
“The governance situation in the country is simply not commensurate because even the minimum rules 
are not being enforced. Having rules is one thing and enforcing them is another. For instance, a law 
has been passed that the minimum wage is K419 000; this is the law but some employers do not apply 
it and no one seems to be concerned. In some cases the laws are weak, a company pollutes a river and 
gets a charge of K12 million. Meanwhile the destruction to nature, fish, the environment, the effect on 
the people who drink from the polluted rivers, is huge. Those who run public offices do not feel 
substantially responsible for their actions.” 
 
 Most of those taking part in the discussions suggested that full integration of corporate governance rules into 
company law provisions is required for effective enforcement, with legitimacy remaining a real issue in this 
context. Wanyama et al. (2009) propose that seamless fusion between the laws of a country and its corporate 
governance codes should be at the core of any proposed legal and regulatory framework. However, given the 
contextual complexities, private law imposition is often favoured over public enforcement, particularly in 
countries where institutional deficiencies abound (La Porta et al., 2000) and participants’ views here were 
consistent with such a proposition. 
 25 
 
As a former British protectorate, Zambia has retained the key traditions of English common law. The “Legal 
Origins Theory” proposed by La Porta et al. (1997) asserts that a country’s legal origin influences the quality 
of legal and regulatory frameworks with the English common law system believed to have a positive legacy. 
However, Zambia’s Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNPD) (2004) argued that the nation’s 
legal culture has not reformed in line with the political and economic changes that began in 1991; while the 
English common law system adapted in its original environment to reflect societal and economic shifts, the 
Zambian system has essentially remained unchanged (MFNPD, 2004). This rigidity has led to concern in 
Zambia over the system’s contemporary appropriateness, where notions of best practice in corporate 
governance remain under pressure from outdated reward and incentive schemes (Haglund, 2008). 
Interviewees here often characterised this lack of appropriate contextualisation, weak regulatory framework 
and inadequate enforcement regime as challenges that continue to impinge on Zambia’s corporate governance 
reform efforts.[21] 
 
Consistent with the evidence found here regarding Zambian perceptions, several studies have highlighted the 
serious consequences that inadequate legal systems and regulatory frameworks have on governance standards 
(La Porta et al., 1997; NEPAD, 2007; Dabor and Adeyemi, 2009). While this literature suggests a consensus 
whereby economic development requires substantive levels of accountability and transparency, more than two 
decades ago the World Bank (1992) pointed out that such changes would require the support of a sound legal 
framework. [22] The findings of the present study suggest that Zambians do not believe that this need has been 
met. Modern academic literature suggests that regulatory advancement in Africa has been strongly influenced 
by international pressure, especially from the US and the UK, but often in a way that does little to enhance 
societal well-being (Josiah et al., 2010). Whilst the majority of participants here did acknowledge that the 
nation’s three current codes draw heavily on Anglo-Saxon precedents, the King Report of South Africa[23] 
was also regularly mentioned – in a positive vein – given cultural and environmental commonalities as well 
as the extent of business ties between Zambia and South Africa. The interviewees also applauded the OECD 
principles, supporting their claim of universal applicability, and referred to the UK’s Cadbury Report as the 
earliest systematic account of corporate governance. More generally, there was a range of views regarding the 
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fact that the three local codes all represent abstractions from documents originally developed elsewhere. Some 
interviewees clearly had concerns in this regard, including interviewee 14, a senior economist in the Africa 
Development Bank, who urged caution thus: 
“Most of the codes in Africa, including the King Report, are strongly influenced by international codes; 
foreign structures will continue to influence things in Africa because of our historical backgrounds. 
But we should not throw away individual countries’ specific circumstances in preference for codes 
from countries at different levels of economic development.”  
 
Others were less perturbed about the external origin of the rules and principles. For example interviewee 9, a 
past IODZ president, pointed out that: 
“We did not start from ground zero, we had to start from somewhere, and we had the UK code, the 
South African King Report, the New Zealand and the OECD guidelines. Much has been drawn from 
these codes, in particular the King Report. There is no way we can ignore what is happening in the 
international arena on corporate governance. The King Report III is particularly relevant.” 
 
In any case, the interviewees as a whole did acknowledge the on-going propensity for harmonisation in global 
standards, as per the earlier arguments of Solomon et al. (2003) who noted a trend of this type more than a 
decade ago. Although Powell and DiMaggio (1991) suggest that imported legal environments represent an 
example of coercive isomorphism in action, Jacobs and Jones (2009 p.17), note that where “goals are 
ambiguous” institutional forces are likely to have a mimetic dimension, whilst the existence of “common 
values” is associated with the presence of normative influences. Thus, the ambiguous responses documented 
here concerning the role of legal framework origin is not contrary to what might be expected, given that both 
the nature and the source of influence are relevant. 
 
5.4 Corporate Governance Compliance in Zambia 
The contention that the benefits of corporate governance are best achieved via compliance with bodies of rules 
and regulations is not new (see e.g. CACG, 1999; Shkolnikov, 2002; Oman, 2003). Consistent with the views 
on tackling corruption outlined earlier, participants in the study suggested that meaningful compliance can 
only take place in an environment where corporate governance guidelines have been established and 
enforcement is the visible responsibility of regulatory bodies with suitable expertise. For example, interviewee 
1 argued that:  
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“Better corporate governance cannot be achieved without better robust regulation and enforcement 
mechanisms. So we need institutions to supervise and regulate corporate governance. Even where there 
are supervisory bodies a number of weaknesses have been detected [ … ] as a country we don’t have 
the expertise to follow-up issues that relate to corporate governance because they are complicated so 
enforcement is minimal. In Zambia, the pressure for compliance is more strongly wielded by the civil 
society than by any other stakeholder group.” 
 
The last sentence here suggests a view that it is, ultimately, only via societal pressure that institutional 
weaknesses in enforcement might be addressed. It is therefore highly relevant in this context that most of those 
who took part in the interviewees argued that the absence in Zambia of laws and regulatory bodies that are 
specific to corporate governance means that compliance is not guaranteed. Again, however, the situation is 
not straight-forward as a parliamentary committee on governance placed the blame for non-compliance 
squarely on business entities’ failure to appreciate the benefits of robust practices (Zambia National Assembly, 
2008). 
 
The three local governance codes all attempt to define the standards of conduct and integrity with which 
relevant companies must comply. Interviewee 17 postulated widespread observance of the LuSE code because 
the process of listing itself calls for the establishment of strong governance systems. Correspondingly 
interviewee 5, an LuSE employee, contended that compliance is now increasing because corporate governance 
awareness programmes have been set up by several quoted companies. Interviewees 5, 7 and 10 all argued 
that adherence to LuSE rules is not likely to represent a major problem for listed firms as most of them are 
multinational in nature and have been subject to similar requirements abroad. More generally, interviewees 
appeared to share the belief that multinational companies with reasonably strong corporate governance 
cultures and structures in their countries of origin do not view compliance as a subject of dispute because for 
them it is a norm. In fact, one of the interviewees (interviewee 10) was CEO of such a firm and he noted that 
his company had created the position of compliance officer, reporting directly to his office on matters such as 
adherence to corporate governance regulations. As regards the BOZ code, three interviewees (interviewees 
7,8 and 12) asserted that compliance is likely to be pervasive on account of the BOZ occupying a commanding 
supervisory and regulatory position for entities in the financial sector. In any case, for both the LuSE and BOZ 
codes, the sponsoring organisation was seen as bearing the burden of monitoring and enforcing compliance. 
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It was pointed out by the interviewees that although SOEs and SMEs represent a large proportion of Zambian 
industrial activity, they fall outside the LuSE and BOZ catchment boundaries. Concerns were raised regarding 
whether, given their size, SMEs should always have a board, audit committee, separate chair and CEO, some 
of the key listing requirements in the LuSE code. Family-held enterprises were, however, seen as being 
reluctant to give up control for the simple reason that they often perceive no-one other than themselves (i.e. 
the owners and founder members) being able to run the firm effectively. The issues raised by the contributors 
in this context resonate with an earlier literature that continues to influence corporate governance debates more 
broadly (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in which analysis of the costs and benefits of managerial 
arrangements of varying scales is part of the theoretical contextualisation. The IODZ has suggested that the 
development of governance guidelines specifically tailored for smaller, unlisted firms is appropriate, although 
mixed views emerged from the discussion here regarding the relevance of such a move. Two specific points 
relating to this issue were made by interviewee 23, a consultant who participated in drafting the IODZ code: 
First, as the IODZ is not a statutory body like other professional organisations in the country such as the 
Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) or the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), membership is 
voluntary; given business practices in the nation, widespread engagement would not appear to be likely. 
Second, the IODZ guidelines were drafted as a ‘sensitisation’ instrument rather than as a compliance code, 
i.e. as an awareness charter intended to re-orient approaches to doing business in a post-state capitalism and 
globalised environment. The document was therefore thought to face challenges regarding the extent of its 
impact on the ground. Arguably most fundamentally of all however - given the wider picture regarding the 
de-facto enforceability of law and regulation in Zambia - is the voluntary nature of IODZ membership, a fact 
referred to here by a Chair of the National Assembly’s Economic Committee (interviewee 20): 
“The weakness with the IODZ corporate governance code is that the IODZ itself is run like an NGO 
such that their decisions are not binding because even membership is voluntary; people join when they 
want and leave as and when they want, so in most cases they are not taken seriously.” 
  
In fact for most of those interviewed, the IODZ rules appeared to represent little more than a guide to educating 
SMEs’ affiliates on the benefits of corporate governance - more of a training manual than a binding 
behavioural code. 
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The “comply or explain” notion has underpinned the vast majority of governance codes published around the 
world over the last 25 years, but others (including the US via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) have 
operationalised a more prescriptive “comply or else” approach, whereby failure to act in accordance with the 
rules exposes the company to judicial punishment. Reddy and Sharma (2014) explicitly link elements of 
isomorphic behaviour to the role of voluntary (i.e. “comply or explain”) corporate governance codes in the 
emerging nation of Fiji, suggesting that this type of institutional force drives firms to follow the rules simply 
to avoid being seen as out of step - and avoid any (perceived) tarnishing of legitimacy - rather than reflecting 
a fundamental desire to behave differently. However, the evidence here suggested a level of underlying 
cynicism regarding the appropriateness of such an approach in Zambia. For example, interviewee 1 argued 
that it makes no sense to embrace “comply or explain” in totality in a country such as Zambia that does not 
have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices. This individual contended further that while 
“enlightened” shareholders in developed countries have other options at their disposal, in Zambia dissatisfied 
shareholders may not have the courage (or propensity) to vote in ways that mitigate against “bad” executive 
behaviour. For interviewee 2, an NGO executive, the critical issue was that the comply or explain principle 
does not in itself indicate which stakeholder groups are entitled to any explanations. Several interviewees 
pointed to the example of South Africa, where the drafting of the King III Report was conceived as partly 
reflecting a desire to incorporate governance principles into the South African Companies Act. This 
development was thought by some to overcome weaknesses detected in the enforcement of standards of a non-
binding legal nature. In this context, interviewee 1 noted that: 
“In South Africa, disclosure is now mandatory and failure to comply will attract penalties because it 
is now law ... The “comply or explain” view means that you leave it up to the market to decide the 
appropriateness of these principles. We can’t leave it up to the market to decide because regulation 
and supervision in this country is very weak. However, for transnational companies listed in countries 
where shareholder activism is strong, this can perhaps work.” 
 
Interviewee 2, an NGO executive went further, claiming that the codes will only be meaningful in Zambia if 
they are connected to specific laws, thus becoming binding and enforceable. His point of view, similar to those 
made by others who viewed mandating as critical for any governance regime, was unequivocal: 
“All the codes in this country are voluntary therefore not relevant to this country because they do not 
provide remedies to the communities affected. [XX] Corporation breached the OECD guidelines in a 
number of areas and complaints were made using the complaints mechanism under OECD through the 
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UK contact point, but all we received was a wishy-washy response. [XX] argued that they cannot be 
punished on the basis of a voluntary code.” 
 
Thus, the need for institutional enforcement of rules rather than simple reliance on isomorphic pressure to 
apply principles - which Reddy and Sharma (2014) suggest in the context of the developing nation of Fiji 
cannot generate “substantive action” (p. 74) – is evident. 
 
5.5 Specific Benefits  
The purported benefits of good corporate governance practices for modern economies have been set out on 
many occasions, in both academic and practical contexts (e.g. OECD, 2004; Solomon, 2013). Several 
interviewees argued that such behaviour is essential for the efficient running of business and overall economic 
well-being. Benefits were believed to accrue across a wide range of stakeholders and at different levels; for 
example interviewee 20, a parliamentarian, argued that: 
“There is everything to gain in governing ourselves properly starting at individual, corporate and state 
levels. We slipped from being a middle-income country in the 1970s to a least developed country due 
to poor governance, especially corporate, because politically we have been relatively stable. There are 
countries that were with us at the same level in the Far East but have gone far ahead. To get rid of 
poverty we must govern ourselves properly politically, economically and in particular [in terms of] 
corporate governance. Good governance is at the heart of development.”[24] 
 
At individual level, corporate governance was seen in an ethical context, potentially minimising personal 
temptation to abuse authority for private expediency. At organisational level, participants argued that robust 
corporate governance has the propensity to help boards align company objectives with shareholder interests, 
consistent with the rationale for the revival of interest in governance in dispersed ownership settings. The 
findings here were also supportive of the contention in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that a lack of oversight will 
lead directors to ignore their fiduciary duties and pursue projects that benefit them as individuals at the expense 
of investors. At state level, it was evident that the government of Zambia is seen as the biggest company in 
the country and, as with any entity controlling resources on behalf of others, key generic principles were 
viewed as being applicable.     
 
An extensive literature has explored the relationship between governance standards and capital flows for 
companies and nations, including in developing world contexts (e.g. La Porta et al., 2000; Klapper and Love, 
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2004; Siddiqui, 2010). The current investigation detected widespread support for the idea that, in a global 
market for capital, countries and companies with sound corporate governance qualities are more likely to 
attract significant investment funds. This view was particularly prevalent amongst those close to industry. For 
example interviewee 10, a CEO, argued that:  
“If you are a company looking for external funding, governance is a critical issue, whether you are 
looking for funding locally or internationally, be it equity or debt. Anyone putting money in your 
business needs assurance that the business is well-run; corporate governance in this context becomes 
core to investment discussions and decisions. African economies have been growing, and as economies 
grow, good corporate governance practices become critical.” 
 
Interviewee 9, a consultant and past president of the IODZ simply stated in this context that: “sound corporate 
governance practices lead to investor confidence, resulting in increased flows of investment.” 
 
Sustainable and long-established weaknesses in accountability have been detected in many African nations 
(Shkolnikov, 2002; Wanyama et al., 2009). Several interviewees explained that in their view Zambia stands 
to benefit from improved corporate governance precisely because the concept emphasises high standards in 
accountability, transparency, ethical conduct and resource allocation - all perceived weaknesses in Zambia - 
(Donge, 2008; Haglund, 2009) that are essential for economic emancipation. Several participants contended 
that strong corporate governance practices lead directly to high levels of investor confidence, indeed it was 
recommended that best practice in this regard be embedded in the nation’s Investments Act and thereby 
become a requirement for those attempting to attract external capital to Zambia. While corporate governance 
brings with it extra costs, the benefits to Zambians are clearly seen as outweighing the latter; unless the focus 
of the debate shifts to potential (tangible) gains instead of expenditure implications, it seems likely that 
widespread scepticism and indifference will persist, prolonging the current inertia. The situation is further 
complicated by the contention made in Eden et al. (2001) that in practice “local” embeddedness provides both 
“constraint and opportunity” going forward; attempts to separate out these potentialities might therefore also 
be required.  
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Corporate governance reform has become a major policy issue not only in the running of companies but also 
in the management of national economies. However, little is known about the extent of understanding or views 
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concerning the concept and its potential outside the world’s richest countries. Without such awareness, it is 
unclear how relevant authorities in the nations concerned will be able to convince the public of the need for 
reform. This becomes a critical issue given earlier contentions that without pervasive comprehension 
developing, de-facto change is extremely unlikely, particularly in Africa. While the hallmark of the modern 
corporation and the separation of ownership and control rights marked the genesis of corporate governance 
reform in most developed nations, in Zambia - where ownership structures, cultural, political and economic 
environments are very different to those in the world’s richest countries - good governance appears to be 
viewed as an economic advancement mechanism. However, the evidence presented here suggests that in the 
Zambian context corporate governance’s propensity to minimise corruption is seen as equally important, 
provided that extant levels of the latter do not themselves prevent the emergence of meaningful enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
The results indicate Zambians’ belief that corporate governance has the potential to quicken the pace of 
economic development. The participants in the research appear to believe that concerns regarding governance 
standards will encourage transparency and accountability in business activities, factors seen in turn as 
necessary for the achievement of significant levels of inward investment and growth. The advocacy of greater 
accountability and transparency across all commercial entities, government and society at large provides 
evidence that Zambians fully acknowledge corporate governance’s role as a potential force for positive 
change. The specific reference made to the government’s status as the biggest public entity in the nation 
implies that the way state resources are controlled and directed requires public scrutiny, with enforceable 
corporate governance principles absolutely vital. Whilst the emergence of the BOZ, the IODZ and the LuSE 
codes (along with the establishment of the governance secretariat and the nation’s accession to APRM) were 
cited as potentially representing moves in the right direction, evident cynicism was such that improvements 
in corporate governance standards in Zambia are not seen as being likely anytime soon. Thus, despite the 
country having avoided much of the political instability often cited as frustrating attempts to improve 
accountability and governance (and more general development efforts) across Africa, the institutional 
weaknesses evidenced in studies elsewhere in the continent are perceived to be just as significant in Zambia. 
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Reflecting this perspective, the lack of accountability discharge was referred to in many contexts, indeed 
institutional failure of this type was arguably the most critical issue identified by the interviewees. Its 
fundamental nature was evident in the widely-held perception that good governance and accountability go 
hand-in-hand, with the latter both representing the cause of economic failures in Zambia and a critical element 
in any long-term improvement in development prospects. However, as in prior studies – and despite Zambia’s 
relative stability – the problems appear to be entrenched at an institutional level. The pervasive difficulties 
identified here therefore suggest a role for the “institutional entrepreneur” suggested by DiMaggio (1988), i.e. 
agents of change who act as catalysts for new institutional relationships. As Sutheewasinnon et al. (2016) 
note, the entrepreneur in this context could be a single organisation or multi-party and so the logic extends to 
situations where most groups in society stand to benefit from any transformation - provided organisation-level 
action can be instigated. 
 
The findings also provide insights regarding the complex evolutionary pattern in pervasion of the term 
“corporate governance” in Zambia, with awareness - whilst growing - still very much embryonic. Its 
modernity perhaps explains why the majority of Zambians lack meaningful awareness of its implications for 
corporations and societal well-being. Perhaps reflecting this knowledge gap, support for a narrow “Cadbury-
style” definition of corporate governance was pervasive despite more detailed discussions revealing the 
widespread view that a working model should be broad enough to allow community, societal and other 
traditional Zambian concerns to be incorporated. Notwithstanding the role of a lack of full comprehension in 
explaining this result, the finding points to the (continuing) dominance of such terminology and 
conceptualisation, confirming the hegemony of western perspectives in global corporate governance debates 
predicted by modern postcolonial theorising (Gallhofer et al., 2011). The study thus provides further support 
(as per Josiah et al., 2010; Sharma et al., 2010; Wanyama et al., 2009, 2013) for the contention that meaningful 
explorations of corporate governance in developing countries like Zambia - where cultural traditions and, 
perhaps more importantly, extant power structures differ markedly from western norms - require direct 
engagement with stakeholders who can voice concerns on the basis of lived experience of institutional systems 
that operate in a different way to that envisaged in the (typically) Anglo-Saxon codes that underpin practice. 
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The need for fundamental institutional reform in Zambia’s regulatory institutions evident here is similar to 
that suggested for Uganda in Wanyama et al. (2009), despite the differences in contexts, notably the more 
significant political upheaval in post-colonial Uganda and the country’s relative lack of natural resources. 
Wanyama et al. go as far as to call for dedicated education in ethics in primary schools if any meaningful 
change is to take place. Given the perceived strength of embedded inertia in Zambia, it is possible that any 
improvement might also require radicalism of this type. What is clear from the emerging literature on 
governance in the African corporate sector - which, based on the evidence presented here, extends to the 
relatively stable nation of Zambia - is that whilst all three types of institutional isomorphism suggested by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are evident, the forces are not all ranged in the same direction. Whilst normative 
influence might help in a push to see best practice codes develop traction and critical mass, the propensity for 
stasis – underpinned by endemic (perceived) corruption is likely to be reflective of coercive pressure. In 
particular, established Zambian actors in the corporate field who might be minded to push for best practice in 
their own organisations would likely face strong resistance from others for whom established power relations 
and incentive schemes have established favourable outcomes on the basis of long-standing business practices. 
Equally, the notion of a mimetic force appears to be manifest, where senior managers in firms and regulators 
witness the individual benefit of weak corporate governance and choose to adapt their internal structure so as 
to maximise their legitimacy and well-being. Notwithstanding these barriers to progress, recognition of the 
existence of these pressures - certainly in so far as wide perception is testament to them - should represent an 
important first step on the road to change. Particularly important in this regard is the evidence presented here 
whereby the mere existence of (in Zambia’s case several) best practice codes is far from sufficient to make a 
difference. 
 
Nothing in these conclusions runs contra to the finding in Wanyama et al. (2009) of strong isomorphic forces 
existing in Uganda; evidence of substantive resistance to change in two very different political contexts 
suggests that the institutional forces concerned might pervade across Africa. Their existence might sensibly 
be considered an important contextualising factor in any attempts to bring about improvements in continent-
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wide governance going forward, irrespective of whether or not these are targeted specifically at encouraging 
foreign aid, or simply as a (morally-driven) end in themselves as implied in Wanyama et al.’s call for better 
pre-teen education on ethics. The evidence presented here suggests commonality across developing nations 
regarding embedded forces that might indeed require the sort of early educational intervention called for by 
Wanyama et al. Whilst Eden et al. (2001) argue that: “… any improvements in teaching of morality might 
flow from cross-border pressures to conform, institutional pressures on the ground mean that all-bracing 
notions of ethics are not appropriate, with local contextualities requiring explicit consideration” (p. 2), the 
underlying – institutionalised – failings might be sufficiently pervasive to broaden the call for ethical education 
across national boundaries.  
 
Ultimately, if the developmental benefits of reliable governance systems - viewed by Zambians taking part in 
the present study to be non-trivial -  are to be reaped in emerging country settings, concerted effort will be 
required to overcome the structural forces that create the vested interests driving opposition to increased 
accountability and openness. The view of Zambians reflected here does not suggest much room for optimism. 
When these findings are considered together with the contention in Wanyama et al. (2009, p. 73) that 
“entrenched structure(s)” affect institutional potential to the extent that “root and branch” change is needed in 
Uganda, as well as Reddy and Sharma (2014)’s evidence of an institutionally-driven need for legitimacy in 
the context of regulatory compliance in Fiji, it is evident that explicit recognition of extant institutional forces 
is required if any deeper understanding of governance practices in developing nations is to emerge and guide 
practical improvement. This need is not just relevant to future academic attempts to suggest normative ways 
forward but also, crucially, for policy makers, standard-setters and regulators charged with economic 
development and social welfare advancement. Without full appreciation of the forces at work in a setting such 
as Zambia, the appropriate processes required to remedy deficiencies are unlikely to be manifest in the 
short/medium term. Of particular note here is that Zambia has no shortage of bodies, organisations and sets of 
rules with theoretical oversight of governance related issues in the nation’s corporate sector; how these various 
entities are reconciled to produce a single unambiguous cross-institutional approach is likely to be critical. 
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The study’s limitations require acknowledgement, most notably the experience of the research team (shared 
by others, e.g. World Bank, 1989; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009) that attaining interview access can 
be highly problematic in developing African nations; in particular, researchers can be treated with suspicion, 
caution and in some cases outright hostility. As set out in the paper, these experiences were consistent with 
this documented pattern and so those who choose to take part in such studies may not necessarily be those 
with the most insightful narratives. Whilst this difficulty represents a potential limitation for investigations of 
perceptions across much of the developing world (Josiah et al., 2010), in all cases the interviewees here were 
given detailed reassurances about the academic purpose of the study and confidences were built up prior to 
and during the early part of the discussions. In so far as the research team could tell, contributions were offered 
freely, honestly and openly, usually in substantial detail, suggesting that the issues at hand related to matters 
that were seen as relevant to current Zambian circumstances. Ultimately, those taking part reflected a very 
wide range of experiential settings and the opinions offered appeared to be thoughtful and relevant in all cases. 
Whilst these difficulties persist, it is now evident that investigation into progress in governance across 
institutions in developing nation settings proceeds most meaningfully with the type of qualitative engagement 
reported on here, and it is critical that this type of endeavour continues to find a place in contemporary debates 
on corporate conduct.  
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NOTES 
1 For example, Wanyama et al. (2013) begin by exploring understanding of the term corporate governance, whilst in Wanyama et 
al. (2009) the analysis separately identifies issues such as corruption and regulatory frameworks. The latter study points to the 
pervasive importance of certain other factors, in particular the role of culture and corruption; here respondents were encouraged to 
talk about these issues as they felt appropriate in the interviews, rather than limiting their importance by treating them as discrete 
topics to be discussed only at pre-defined points. 
2 Donor conditionality has only been explored tangentially in prior literature, but was considered likely to be important for Zambia 
given on-going debate in the nation regarding an IMF bail-out and the emphasis the latter institution places on good governance. 
See Lusaka Times (2016); IMF (2016) and the associated discussion in Section 2 of the present study. 
3 Whilst there is an inherent potential bias in the use of this category, it is clear from earlier studies of developing nations that whilst 
sound understanding of the potential benefits of robust governance practice exists, it can get lost in the presence of broader 
negativity. For example, in Wanyama et al. (2009), various tangible benefits are attested to by participants in the study - as well as 
belief in a legal system that could support meaningful change - yet the study’s overall conclusion suggests an overwhelmingly bleak 
outlook for Uganda without major systemic developments. 
4During the 1970s, most Africa nations experienced deteriorating output levels, massive budget deficits, chronic balance-of-
payments figures and heavy indebtedness, with the economic growth rate failing far below the population growth rate. Arguably the 
most significant impact of these difficulties was dropping of the continent’s economic situation from developed world conversations 
that increasingly focussed on dealing with the consequences of widespread demands for an end to colonisation (Bratton and van de 
Walle, 1997). 
5 In addition, Kayatekin (2009, p. 1115) identifies “ongoing material and ideological legacies of colonialism” in many developing 
nations, irrespective of any need for structural changes reflecting indigenous culture(s). 
6The World Bank (1989) argued simply that: “Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance” 
(p.60).  
7 Whilst Tsamenyi et al. provide evidence from the developed world, Josiah et al. (2010) point to an element of universality in 
(de)regulatory-driven changes in corporate governance. Equally, Sharma at el. (2010) note that whilst institutional theory has often 
been employed as an exposition of observed outcomes, it is equally appropriate for use in dynamic contexts such as modern corporate 
governance research. 
8 Between 1995 and 1998 twelve prominent Zambian banks collapsed: The Meridian BIAO bank; The African Commercial Bank; 
The Commerce Bank; The Lima Bank; The Prudence Bank; The Credit Africa Bank; The Manifold Investment Bank; The First 
Merchant Bank; The Zambia Export and Import Bank Limited (EXIM); The Co-operative Bank; The Union Bank; and The United 
Bank of Zambia. In each case, governance failures were a key factor (Maimbo, 2002). 
9Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism is a voluntary self-monitoring initiative. Its stated aims include, inter alia, promoting economic 
growth through the implementation of codes and standards of corporate governance.  
10 Four of the interviewees did not want certain parts of the interview to be taped because of security concerns. 
11 As can be seen from Table 1, the number of words transcribed ranged from 476 to close to 2949. The mean was 1346. 
12 Although one interview was conducted in a garage while mechanics were repairing the interviewee’s vehicle. 
13 Two interviewees preferred to be interviewed in the early morning, before people started reporting for work. 
14 The lack of a common definition of corporate governance in prior analyses, including in the developed world where most attention 
has been paid to the concept, underpins the decision made here not to set out any a-priori formulation. 
15 Formally: “The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.” 
16 Extant Zambian codes of corporate governance (i.e. the LuSE, BOZ and IODZ documents) draw extensively on the Cadbury 
Report and its definition continues to be employed by the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Zambia Country Self-Assessment 
Report. 
17 Such a coincidence of perception, whilst on the surface surprising, is not uncommon in studies of governance in post-colonial 
Africa, where overarching cynicism appears to lead to homogeneity in the opinions solicited about key governance issues. For 
example, Wanyama et al. (2009) report that concern about enforcement and ethical standards underpin consistently negative 
perceptions regarding the influence of many factors (including those of a legal, economic, cultural, accounting and political nature) 
on corporate practices in Uganda. 
18 Zambia’s colonial history was pointed out in this regard, in particular the fact that most governance structures were simply 
imposed by colonial authorities without any meaningful contribution by the locals. Adopting the principles initiated by colonial 
rulers was believed by the interviewees to represent another form of colonialisation. This perception ties in with the broad notion of 
pervasive - but not always directly identifiable - post-colonial influence in modern developing nations (Gallhofer et al., 2011). 
19 This perspective appeared to reflect a belief that in today’s globalised economy it is those with money who dictate the pace and 
direction of investment in developing nations and this reality had to be recognised. 
20 Concerns regarding extant levels of corruption were made explicit by interviewees 1,2,3,4,6,7,813,14,15,17,20,22,23 and 24. 
21 The following quotes are typical of those put forward by the interviewees in this context: “Institutions are there but they are weak” 
(interviewee 3); “The forms of institutions are there but the substance is not” (4); “They lack adequate laws to back them” (6); 
“Zambia lacks institutional capacity” (7); “We have the institutions, they are just weak” (8); “Institutions are there but they lack the 
capacity to implement and enforce” (12); “We have institutions but they need strengthening” (13); “Institutions are there but  they 
are very weak” (14); “Institutions are there but they need strengthening” (19); “Accountability institutions are weak” (18); and 
“Governance institutions are weak” (17). 
22 In addition, the OECD’s corporate governance principles of 2004 recognise the centrality of robust law thus: “Corporate 
governance is only part of the larger economic context in which firms operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies 
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and the degree of competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework also depends on the legal, 
regulatory, and institutional environment” (p. 12). 
23The influence of the three King Reports (I, II and III; 1994, 2002 and 2009 respectively) seems to be permeating to other countries 
via links that individual stock exchanges are developing with the Johannesburg market. This trend has been suggested as being 
positive in supporting robust corporate governance practices (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). 
24 Thus supporting the call for Uganda in Wanyama et al. (2013). 
 1 
Table 1: List of Interview Participants 
 
 Interviewee Sector Interviewee 
code 
Experience Transcription 
(Number of 
Words) 
Location 
1 Researcher/ Lecturer Academician C01 25 years 2,949 Residence 
2 Executive Director NGO C02 12 years 2,014 Residence 
3 Executive 
Management 
IODZ C03 8 years 1,115 IODZ Office 
4 World Bank World Bank C04 15 years 1,816 World Bank Office 
5 CEO Lusaka Stock 
Exchange 
C05 4 years 1,090 LuSE Office 
6 Executive Director NGO C06 21 years 783 NGO Office 
7 Executive 
Management 
Zambia Business 
Forum 
C07 20 years 1,123 Lusaka Show Grounds 
8 Executive Director Parastatal 
Organisation 
C08 16 years 1,417 C.E.O Official Office 
9 Past IODZ President Governance 
Consultant 
C09 30 years 1,695 Consultancy Office 
10 CEO Multinational C10 18 years 1,256 C.E.O Official Office 
11 IODZ IODZ C11 20 years 1,916 IODZ Office  
12 Management Government 
Agency 
C12 15 years 972 Central Bank Office 
13 Executive Director Regulator C13 23 years 1,083 Government Office 
14 Senior Economist Africa 
Development 
Bank 
C14 7 years 1,018 ADB Office 
15 Executive 
Management 
Economic 
Commission for 
Africa 
C15 30 years 1,002 ECA Office 
16 Senior Auditor Office of the 
Auditor General 
C16 6 years 476 OAG Office 
17 Executive 
Management 
Private Sector C17 20 years 1,237 Company Office 
18 President IODZ C18 29 years 1,093 IODZ Office 
19 Researcher/ Lecturer Academician C19 35 years 975 University of Zambia 
20 Economic Committee 
- Chair  
National 
Assembly 
C20 24 years 1,904 Motor Repairs Garage 
21 Chairperson - PSDA Consultant, 
Businessman 
C21 22 years 1,284 Mulungushi Conference 
Centre Office 
22 Consultant Research and 
consultancy 
C22 43 years 1,093 Consultancy Office 
23 
 
24 
Consultant 
 
Researcher/ Lecturer 
Governance 
Consultant 
Academician 
C23 
 
C24 
39 years 
 
20 years 
2,012 
 
976 
Residence 
 
ZICA Office 
Total number of words after transcription 32,299  
 
Note: The table provides details regarding the interviewees taking part in the study. The table does not disclose the names of 
individual participants as they were guaranteed anonymity. * PSDA = Private Sector Development Agency. 
